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In 2009, world GDP contracted by 1.1 percent. The eco-
nomic slowdown was truly global in that growth slowed in
every  region  of  the  world.  Whereas  the  developed
economies, central and southern Europe, the former Soviet
countries, as well as Latin America and the Caribbean expe-
rienced actual recession, the rest of the world experienced
lower, but still positive growth. The highest growth rates
were achieved in East Asia (+6.1 percent) and South Asia
(+5.0 percent).
Growth in global employment was still positive in 2009
(+0.7 percent), but it slowed substantially from its rate in
2007 (+1.9 percent). The slowdown was evident across all
regions of the world, except for the Middle East. The most
affected regions (developed economies, central and southern
Europe, and former Soviet countries) actually experienced
negative employment growth. As a result, the latest prelim-
inary estimates for 2009 from the International Labour Of-
fice’s Global Employment Trends (January 2010) suggest an
increase of 0.9 percentage points in global unemployment,
to 6.6 percent. Although the increase is strongest in the de-
veloped economies (+2.6 percent) and in central and south-
ern Europe and the former Soviet Union (+2.0 percent), all
regions of the world experienced an increase in the unem-
ployment rate. This fact raises a number of important ques-
tions: How long will it take for employment growth to re-
cover? What  explains  the  difference  in  the  adjustment
patterns across countries? What role can policy play to mit-
igate the employment effect and promote recovery?
The Average Crisis Effect
Slowdowns of world GDP growth occurred in 1991–93,
1998, and 2001, but none of them reached the magnitude
of the current global economic crisis (figure 1).
Employment effects of the recent global economic crisis have differed significantly across countries. An active public
debate currently focuses on external shocks and the role of labor market policies as a driver of those differences. In
this note, we analyze the roles of integration into the global economy and different labor market institutions during
different phases of past global economic downturns and domestic banking and debt crises. We find that domestic
debt and banking crises were much more severe in their impact on employment than were global economic
downturns: on average, the reduction in employment growth was more than twice as strong. We also find that
openness to trade has both deepened the contractionary effects on employment and allowed for a faster recovery.
High severance pay dampened the employment effect in both domestic crises and global economic downturns,
whereas very high unemployment benefits were associated with stronger reductions in employment growth.Figure 2a depicts the average pattern of employment
growth around the three global economic downturns in the
20-year period from 1985 to 2005. Figure 2b shows the re-
sponse of employment growth to domestic banking crises
that reached a systemic level, and to sovereign debt crises
that led to a government default to private lenders (as de-
fined by Laeven and Valencia [2008]). It is not surprising that
the reduction in employment growth is more pronounced
(amounting to more than twice the magnitude) under a do-
mestic banking or debt crisis than during a global downturn.
We believe that both observations are relevant to under-
stand the impact of the global economic downturn of 2008–
09. The whole world experienced a decline in global de-
mand, larger in size but comparable in nature to previous
global economic downturns. And in a number of countries
(mainly among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation
and Development members and former Soviet countries),
the financial shock of 2008–09 triggered domestic banking
or debt crises. Typically, these countries were affected more
severely in terms of employment growth than were coun-
tries that “only” experienced the global demand collapse.
The data also show that, on average, the effects of past
global downturns persisted longer (with the second lag being
the lowest point in global downturns), whereas employment
growth reverted faster after domestic crises. How the com-
bination of the two crises experienced by some countries in
2008–09 will affect recovery remains to be seen.
The Role of Openness
To analyze the role of openness for the dynamics of employ-
ment growth, we evaluate the average response to a crisis for
countries with a low ratio of trade (imports + exports) to
GDP (25 percent), and we compare the response to coun-
tries with a high openness level (corresponding to 130 per-
cent). Box 1 presents a detailed description of the estimation
procedure. The respective values are the mean openness plus
or minus one standard deviation in our sample. This corre-
sponds roughly to the average openness value for Pakistan or
the United States in the low-openness case and to the value
for Bulgaria or The Netherlands in the high-openness case.
We find that particularly during domestic crises, higher
openness led to a stronger reduction in employment growth
in the initial phase of the crisis, but also allowed for a faster
recovery.
















Figure 1. World GDP and Employment Growth, 1985–2009











































–3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5
Source: Authors’ calculations.
years before/after crisis
Figure 2. Average Employment Growth around Domestic Crises and Global Downturns, 1985–2005
Cl ± 1 standard deviation
a. Global crisis
average growth rate
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average growth rate
Cl ± 2 standard deviationsThe initial negative impact of openness in the case of a
debt and banking crisis is consistent with findings on the im-
portance of access to finance for exporters (see Berman
[2009] or Iacovone and Zavacka [2009]). This provides a
potential explanation for the observed patterns: Unlike a
global economic downturn, banking and debt crises have a
direct impact on the availability of credit for firms. Because
exporters are more sensitive to changes in external finance
conditions, given their high up-front costs, the higher the
trade-to-GDP ratio, the stronger the importance of the fi-
nancial constraint and the more pronounced the impact on
employment. When financial constraints become less bind-
ing and real depreciation allows net exports to rebound,
more-open economies can recover quicker because they are
less constrained by domestic demand. This argument is also
supported by the different dynamics of export growth in do-
mestic crises versus global downturns. In the former, the re-
duction is more pronounced; but it shows a more profound
rebound in the following year.
The Role of Labor Market Institutions
Analysis of labor market policy is constrained by the avail-
ability of data. Unfortunately, detailed information on active
labor market policies that many countries apply during
times of crises is not available for a sufficiently large (and
long) sample of countries. We thus restrict ourselves to an
analysis of labor market institutions, for which data are more
widely available. In a first step, we use a proxy for the costs
associated with laying off workers. Again, we compare the
response if severance pay is one standard deviation below
the mean with the case in which severance pay is one stan-
dard deviation above the mean.
There is a clear association of higher severance pay with
a lower drop in employment growth. This is the case for
both global downturns and domestic crises. Countries that
are in the lower 20th percentile of severance pay suffer a
drop that, on average, is twice the size of the drop in em-
ployment growth experienced by countries in the upper
20th percentile. Apparently, firms find it more profitable to
adjust to a negative shock through layoffs when severance
pay is low. If severance pay is high, firms find it more costly
to adjust through layoffs; they revert to other means of ad-
justment. These alternative means could include reductions
in wages or work hours. Limited availability of data does not
allow us to test this hypothesis for the entire data set; for the
subsample of countries for which we have data on real
wages, however, we do find that real wages drop more
markedly during a crisis if severance pay is high.
In a second step, we investigate how unemployment ben-
efits alter the response of employment to a crisis or global
downturn by replacing the severance pay with the share of
previous income that is replaced by unemployment entitle-
ments in the first year after a job loss. It turns out that coun-
tries with higher unemployment benefits suffered, on aver-
age, a more severe reduction in employment growth. One
potential reason for this finding is that unemployment ben-
efits can act as downward real wage rigidity. (See Campolmi
and Faia [forthcoming] or Zanetti [2006] for a theoretical
foundation.) If unemployment benefits are high, workers re-


















Source: Authors’ calculations, based on dynamic estimation of employment
growth (see box 1).
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on dynamic estimation of employment
growth (see box 1).
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b. Domestic crisissist a downward correction of wages because of the favorable
outside option, and firms faced with high real wages are
forced to adjust by reducing their workforce. Another poten-
tial explanation is the role of informal employment: In poor
countries with no or very few unemployment benefits and
welfare systems, workers who lose a formal job are often
forced to take up informal activities instead. Thus, they do
not appear as unemployed in our data; but they typically
suffer a substantial deterioration in their incomes and work-
ing conditions. Unfortunately, a detailed analysis of these dy-
namics in our model is precluded by the scarcity of data on
formal versus informal employment.
To better understand the effects of unemployment bene-
fits and severance pay, we perform some robustness checks.
We exclude once the lower 20th percentile and once the up-
per 20th percentile of the distribution to determine whether
results are nonlinear in the sense that they might be driven
by countries with very generous benefits or very high sever-
ance pay. Although our results for severance pay are robust
to this exclusion, the results for unemployment benefits are
strongly driven by countries that have unemployment ben-
efits in the upper 20th percentile. Thus, moderate unem-
ployment benefits that provide a safety net for workers do
not appear to be detrimental on either cycle of employment
growth during times of crisis.
Relevance for Policy
Our research provides some direct and some indirect obser-
vations that are relevant for policy making during crises.
First, domestic banking and debt crises have had a much
larger impact on employment growth than have global eco-
nomic downturns. This emphasizes the importance of the
first line of defense for countries to protect themselves
against the contagion of financial crises. Sound macroeco-
nomic policies should be at the core of their defense. Sec-
ond, deeper integration into the world economy leads to a
deeper and faster initial slowdown of employment growth,
particularly during domestic crises; but it also leads to faster
and sharper recovery. Adopting protectionist policies as a cri-
sis unfolds thus seems like very bad policy. In terms of labor
market policies, high severance pay seems to have been ef-
fective in encouraging companies to adjust to crises through
means other than layoffs. Although not explicitly tested in
our research, this also suggests that temporary subsidies for
maintaining employees on payroll—as used by many gov-
ernments during the 2008–09 crisis—can be quite effective.
With respect to unemployment benefits, the results are
more mixed. Although our research does not call into ques-
tion the importance of unemployment benefits as a means to
protect workers against the social impact of a crisis, it points
to a potential trade-off between maintaining very high un-
employment benefits and the goal of minimizing employ-
ment losses during a crisis. Additional research on this topic
would be highly desirable—particularly research taking into
account the role of informal employment in countries with
low unemployment benefits. Unfortunately, such study is
currently very difficult because of data limitations. The same
problem prevents more accurate research into a number of
other important questions in this context, such as the effect
of other labor market policies, the impact of crises on wages
and work hours, and the sectoral differences in the employ-


















Source: Authors’ calculations, based on dynamic estimation of employment
growth (see box 1).
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Source: Authors’ calculations, based on dynamic estimation of employment
growth (see box 1).
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b. Domestic crisisment impact. There is a great need for the international com-
munity to strengthen its efforts to collect and provide high-
quality data on employment and labor markets.
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Box 1. Merits and Caveats of the Estimation Approach
We make use of a dynamic panel model of employment growth
to estimate the response of employment to the two types of
crises. The estimation equation describes current employment
growth by its lagged value and the current and lagged crisis dum-
mies, controlling for country fixed effects that capture cross-
country differences constant across time. To analyze how the
transmission of the two types of crises varies with the degree of
openness and the labor market institutions, both crisis dummies
are also interacted with the respective values. The combination
of a lagged endogenous variable and country fixed effects causes
ordinary least squares estimates to be biased. (For a detailed
treatment, see Nickell [1981] and Arellano and Bond [1991]).
To address this bias, we apply instrumental variable techniques
following Arellano and Bover (1995). The coefficient estimates
are then used to simulate the dynamic response of employment
growth to the different types of crises for different constellations
of labor market institutions and different degrees of openness. 
In contrast to a static analysis, this approach not only takes
the dynamic nature of employment growth explicitly into ac-
count; it also is well suited to make statements about the speed
of the adjustment process and the persistence in the deviation
from trend growth. Thus it is well suited to analyze the short-run
deviation of employment growth in response to the specific type
of crisis and how it varies with a specific country’s fundamentals. 
The limitations of this approach are threefold. First, the limi-
tation of the number of lags with which the crisis dummies enter
in the regression implies that if a catch-up takes place at a higher
lag order, it cannot be captured by the regression framework.
Based on the finding that the crisis dummies enter the regression
generally insignificant at the third lag, we include the crisis dum-
mies up to the second lag. However, it is possible that a catch-up
process takes place only four to five years after the crisis (a catch-
up that we would fail to capture). 
A way to avoid this caveat is to include more than three lags
in the regression. Doing so leads to the second limitation, the
lack of time-series long enough for a sufficient amount of coun-
tries. Thus, it is not feasible to include more lags because each
additional lag reduces the number of observations and causes
small-sample bias in the estimation.
Finally, this particular estimation framework can evaluate the
role of openness and labor market institutions only for the spe-
cific case of a global or domestic crisis. It is mute on the poten-
tial role of openness and labor market institutions for a potential
positive demand shock or different types of shocks. Furthermore,
the approach explains the short-run dynamics. No inference can
be made about the role of openness and labor market institutions
for long-run employment growth. 
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